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AbSTRACT
The aim of this article is to examine the relationship between accounting conservatism and 
earnings quality. Data were collected from 50 industrial corporations listed in Amman 
Stock Exchange (ASE) between 2004-2009. Hypotheses were tested using Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) and Binary Logistic under Pooled Regression. The findings revealed that the 
level of conservatism was low in such companies, but earnings quality was reasonable. The 
study found that there was no variance between levels of earnings quality of the Jordanian 
industrial corporations, due to the disparity of the level of conservatism in their financial 
reports.  
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I. INTRODUCTION
Decisions based on earnings information 
vary according to different users of financial 
statements, while   shareholders   consider 
earnings   the criterion of managers’ 
performance for rewards, creditors depend 
on earnings when taking credit decisions. As 
for investors, they take earnings as a means 
of evaluating their investments through 
what the recent earnings predict regarding 
the earning continuity in the coming epochs 
(Block, 1999). Dependence on numbers 
alone, without considering other factors 
that affect the level of earnings quality 
such as earnings management and the rise 
in accruals ratio, leads to taking reasonable 
decisions which focus on earnings amount 
without any regard to quality. (Chan et al, 
2006). Most of past studies revealed that 
constant earnings   were   indicators of 
quality. As accounting conservatism impels 
loss confession and delays earnings, the 
confession of net earnings is away from 
optimism that holds a great amount of 
continuity in the future. Consequently, many 
researchers tried to establish relationship 
between accounting conservatism and 
earnings quality, which is the concern of this 
study. But what if the company practices 
earnings management in order to reduce its 
earnings (negative earnings management), 
can we then talk about the quality of such 
earnings? We all know that one of the most 
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important methods   adopted by the company 
to reduce earnings is discretionary accruals. 
Sloan (1996) indicated that earnings quality 
means constant cash flows other than 
constant accruals. This does not contradict 
with negative earnings management. What 
if we know that some people like (Labo & 
Zhou, 2006; Jain & Rezaee 2004; Yaseen 
2008) consider accruals reduction in ratio to 
less than earnings  within  a certain period 
of time to be an indicator that companies 
follow conservative policies and delay 
the confession of earnings. Thus, we can 
theoretically say that wherever there is 
accounting conservatism, earnings quality 
exists. Such a thing does not hamper the 
company from following earnings negative 
management as long as it is within the limits of 
international accounting standards. Standard 
designers, legislators, and auditors consider 
earnings as high quality, if it is disclosed 
in conformity with generally accepted 
accounting principles, creditors consider 
it good whenever potentials to change 
into cash flows are higher. Compensation 
bodies in American companies consider 
earnings quality to be high when it reflects 
the actual performance of managers without 
being affected by external factors outside 
their control. (Dechow & Schrand, 2004; 
Qaraqeesh, 2009)
Achieving goals of accounting information 
for preceding groups is what accounting 
standards, which contain a great amount 
of conservatism, tried to secure. Thus, 
the major problem of this study lies in its 
attempt to find answers to the following 
questions: Do financial reports issued by 
industrial companies listed on (ASE) reflect 
a reasonable level of conservatism and 
earnings quality? Can we prove that there 
is theoretical relation between accounting 
conservatism and earnings quality? This 
study is the latest among efforts exerted 
to determine the level of accounting 
conservatism in Jordanian companies and 
factors affecting them. After the studing: 
company size, debt contracts, sector to 
which the company belongs, regarding the 
level of accounting conservatism, in addition 
to  the  relation  between audit quality and 
accounting conservatism, and its role in 
improving the quality of financial reports, 
this study becomes an important block 
in the field as it tries to answer a question 
which has been frequently repeated by past 
studies on the relation between accounting 
conservatism and earnings quality. Hereby, 
it endeavors to measure  accounting 
conservatism using a methodology different 
from ones used by past studies. It also 
tries to check earnings quality of industrial 
companies listed on (ASE). It eventually 
looks for the relation between accounting 
conservatism and earnings quality.
The article is organized as follows: section 
two: literature review and previous studies, 
section three: study methodology, section 
four: analysis of study findings, section five: 
discussion of conclusion, recommendations, 
limitations, and future studies. 
II. LITERATURE   REVIEW   
     AND   PREVIOUS STUDIES
Investors concerned with earnings quality 
increased during the last decade after many 
international companies announced about 
non-authentic and temporary earnings as part 
of their quarterly reports. Thus, investors 
became more cautious in considering net 
earnings. (Ohlson & Feltham, 1995) define 
earnings quality as investor’s ability to 
predict future abnormal earnings depending 
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on recent data. But Qaraqeesh, (2009) sees 
that the real earnings quality is the one 
honestly and justly announced by companies 
about their actual earnings. In other words, 
the announced earnings of companies have a 
substantial financial existence which is void 
of exaggeration or probability figures.
Many definitions of earnings quality revolve 
around the two previous ones. Earnings 
quality is the ability of the present earnings 
to provide a real picture about the company 
and its ability to survive in the future. The 
significance of earnings quality stems from 
earnings on which many parties depend 
when they take their decision (Dechow & 
Dichev, 2002).
Qaraqeesh, (2009) believes that earnings 
quality is considered an important factor 
in the financial statement and is used as a 
guidance to decision making. Depending on 
earnings of low quality leads to inappropriate 
management of fortune (Schipper & 
Vincent, 2003). Understanding earnings 
quality plays important role in the process 
of financial analysis; earnings of high 
quality help financial analysts in analyzing 
three basic sides of information which 
are: present functional performance of the 
company, future functional performance 
and value of the company. (Dechow & 
schrand, 2004). In addition, earnings quality 
might be used as an indicator of dividends. 
Farinha & Moreira, (2007) ascertains that 
there is relation between earnings quality 
and dividends, possibility of dividends 
by companies increases as quality itself 
improves, the amount of such dividends also 
increases. 
There are different views regarding concept 
of earnings quality, while some use earnings 
continuity as standard of its quality as 
explained by (Altamuro & Beatty, 2006), 
the continuity of earnings refers to the 
relationship between present earnings with 
future ones. As earnings are divided into 
cash flows and accruals, quality earnings 
means that cash flows are more than accruals 
(Sloan, 1996). Others indicate that earnings 
quality is better once free from earnings 
management practices; the less discretionary 
accruals are the better quality is (Francis 
et al, 2004; Dechow & Dichev, 2002; Al-
Sharif, 2008). Different styles for measuring 
earnings quality led to different evaluations, 
the same company might be given higher or 
lower quality level according to the earnings 
quality form adopted (Abdelghani, 2005).
At the same time Baxter & Cotter, (2009) 
tried to study the forming and characteristics 
of audit committees and their impact on 
improving earnings quality in a sample of 
Australian companies before introducing 
obligatory requirements to audit committees 
2003. The results of that study showed 
that forming audit committee reduces 
earnings management, but did not reduce 
accrual estimation errors. The study also 
showed that there was significant relation 
between financial experience of members 
of audit committee and earnings quality 
improvement. The other qualities of audit 
committee did not have any relatively 
significant relation with earnings quality.  
Various studies provided many other 
factors influencing earnings quality. Teitel, 
& Machuga, (2010) found that supporting 
rules of corporate governance contributed in 
improvement of earnings quality. Altamuro 
& Beatty, (2006) also found that internal 
control quality played a role in improving 
earnings quality.
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In comparing public firms with private 
ones, Givoly et al, (2010) found that the 
public ones were more conservative in their 
financial reports than private ones and their 
management practice through using normal 
accruals was less. Consequently, earnings 
quality in these firms was better than that 
in the private ones and that was due to the 
desire of the directors of public firms to 
avoid litigation risk and agency costs.   
With regard to the relation between auditing 
quality and improving earnings quality, 
Hamdan & Abu Ijeila, (2012) found that 
auditing quality of audit offices in Jordan 
did not contribute in limiting earning 
management practices in Jordan industrial 
companies subject to auditing. Such offices 
never played a role in increasing earning 
qualities in Jordanian industrial companies. 
But Teitel & Machuga’s, (2010) study on 
the impact of application of Code of Best 
Governance Practices in the presence of 
external auditors from highly qualified audit 
offices found that it helps in improving 
earnings quality. Balsam et al, (2003) 
studied the impact of one of the auditing 
quality professional auditor’s specialization 
on discretionary accruals and found that 
the companies which used professional 
specialized auditors had less discretionary 
accruals compared to companies which used 
less professionally specialized auditors. 
Therefore, one can claim that companies 
with professionally specialized auditors 
enjoy a higher level of earnings quality. 
Today, in the middle of the waves of skepticism 
regarding financial reports, adherence to this 
principle became a distinguishing aspect for 
companies with reference to the transparency 
of their financial reports and a standard for 
classifying countries according to adherence 
to accounting principles (Hamdan, 2012) 
and conservatism which disclose the 
expected losses aside from the anticipated 
earnings, in addition to the lowest values 
of assets. Accounting conservatism implies 
using strict standards when declaring profits 
(LaFond & Roychowdhury, 2008). This 
should not lead to undervaluing of assets or 
income (IASB framework, paragraph 37) 
is: IASB, (2010). Applying International 
Financial Reporting Standards. Second 
Edition, Wiley Company, UK.
The need for conservatism appeared together 
with Agency Theory (Basu, 1997) to solve 
the problem that might emerge between 
managers and stockholders on separation 
between management and ownership. 
Suppose that financial reports issued by the 
management were conservative (Ball, et al, 
2000; Watts, 2003b), stockholders might 
resort to reducing management salaries to 
compensate for the difference attributed to 
manager’s care for their personal interests. 
To avoid such situation, managers might 
resort to present more conservative numbers 
as indication of not caring for their personal 
interests (Watts & Zimmerman, 1983), thus 
shunning legal responsibility (Givoly & 
Hayn, 2000). Ahmed & Duellman, (2007) 
found out that accounting conservatism 
helps reduce agency costs. Finally, Hamdan 
(2011) found that accounting conservatism 
contributes in improving. 
As for the role of accounting conservatism 
in improving efficiency of debt contracts, 
studies of the last period ascertained 
that accounting conservatism helped  in 
improving efficiency of debt contracts by 
increasing ability of accounting information 
to predict the future  (Watts, 2003a; Ball 
and Shivakumar, 2005; Ball et al, 2008). 
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Accounting conservatism secures, for the 
debtors, more strict policies in declaring 
profits and consequently limits profit 
distribution as this provides the company 
with a better opportunity to meet its liabilities. 
But Gigler et al, (2009) see that accounting 
conservatism reduces the efficiency of debt 
contracts because it changes the content of 
accounting, thus reducing the possibility of 
future prediction.
In search for factors influencing the level 
of accounting conservatism, many studies 
considered distinction between companies 
regarding accounting conservatism in their 
financial reports. Hamdan, (2012) and 
Yaseen, (2008) found out that banks are 
the most conservative in their accounting 
policies. But (Al-Sahli, 2009) disagreed with 
them as he found that the banking sector in 
Saudi Arabia was the least conservative in 
its accounting policies.  As for the relation 
between the size of company and accounting 
conservation, Hamdan, (2012) found 
that small companies adopt conservative 
accounting policies, but Al-Sahli (2009) 
did not find any relation between size of 
the company and degree of accounting 
conservatism. Hamdan, (2012) and Al-
Sahli, (2009) did not find any effect of debt 
on accounting conservatism, but found that 
establishing Saudi Stock Exchange had 
an effect on accounting conservatism in 
financial reporting and that agreed with what 
the study of Labo & Zhou, (2006) reached 
at The demands of US securities Exchange 
Commission helped in increasing accounting 
conservatism in financial reporting. 
Accounting conservatism also helps in 
quality disclosure (Paprocki & Stone, 2004; 
Yaseen, 2008). Accounting conservatism 
also plays a role in earnings quality, being 
continuous (Penman & Zhang, 2002).
Our study differs from previous ones that 
it tries to provide additional evidence on 
relation between accounting conservatism 
and earnings quality in Jordanian 
environment which was never tackled by 
any of the previous studies.  It also tries 
to measure accounting conservatism and 
earnings quality using methods never used 
by past studies in Jordan.
III. RESEARCH 
       METHODOLOGY
Study sample 
The study sample included all Jordanian 
industrial corporations which meet the 
following conditions; availability of all 
necessary data, never been merged or delisted 
through the period of the study. The number 
of companies that met such conditions from 
2004–2009 was 50 corporations.
Models and measuring of variables  
This study aims to measure the relation 
between accounting conservatism and 
earnings quality. Due to this, the level of 
accounting conservatism in financial report 
should be measured first, then measure the 
level of earnings quality, and finally establish 
a relationship between them.
Measuring of conservatism 
There are many propositions for measuring 
accounting conservatism of financial 
reports. The commonest three models are: 
the wide-spread Basu 1997 model, but 
this model can’t be used in this study as a 
general index of the level of conservatism 
of a group of companies for certain period 
of time, in addition, its results can’t be used 
in multiple-regression  models to find the 
relation between conservatism and earnings 
quality. This model was used by Hamdan 
(2012) to measure the level of conservatism 
in reports issued by Jordanian companies.
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reports issued by Jordanian corporations 
and produced significant results in this 
respect, independent hypothesis for the 
level of accounting conservatism will never 
be tackled in this study which will suffice 
itself with measuring the level of accounting 
conservatism in order to measure its relation 
to earnings quality.
Measuring of  Earnings Quality 
This study adopted two of the commonest 
models for measuring earnings quality 
which are: Richardson et al, (2005) model, 
and Jones, (1991) model as modified by 
Dechow et al, (1995).
The first model
There are different interpretations for 
earnings quality, among them is the use of 
earnings continuity as indicator of earnings 
quality (Altamuro & Beatty, 2006; Schipper 
& Vincent, 2003). Sloan, (1996) explained 
that earnings quality implies continuity of 
cash flows more than accruals continuity. 
Richardson et al, 2005) developed a model 
to determine the range of earnings continuity 
in the future as the following equation no. 2 
shows.
Where: 
ROI
i,t+1
: is return on investment for firm (i) 
in the next year (t+1).
γ0: is constant.
γ
1
: is continuity of cash flows.
γ2: is continuity of accruals.
ROIi,t: is return on investment for firm (i) in 
year (t).
TAACi,t:  is total accruals  for firm (i) in year 
(t).
Earnings quality means that next year’s 
The second measurement is the Book-to-
Market (BTM) Approach which compares 
book value to that of the market in order to 
test value of the stock of origin by comparing 
its book value to the market value. The 
book value is calculated by dividing (total 
shareholders’ equity minus preferred stocks) 
on the weighted-average number of shares 
outstanding, the market value is the closing 
price at the end of the year. ( Beaver & Ryan, 
2005). Jain & Rezaee, (2004) Indicated that 
as the Book-to-Market ratio is less than one 
when compared to the market value; such a 
thing implies the presence of an acceptable 
level of accounting conservatism in financial 
reports, this shows that the book value of the 
company is valued less than its real status, 
thus the essence of conservatism. Using 
(BTM) ratio suits this study as it provides 
us with annual value for each individual 
company; therefore, it might be used in 
multiple-regression model. 
The third technique is the ratio of Total 
Accruals to Gross Profit (TATGP), adopting 
conservatism leads to continuity of negative 
accruals through long period of time because 
accruals increase income when positive and 
decrease it when negative (Mushtaha, 2008). 
total accruals are calculated according to 
cash flow techniques as shown in equation 
no. 1. 
Where: 
TACCi,t: is total accruals for firm (i) in year 
(t).
NIi,t: is net income for firm (i) in year (t).
OCFi,t: is operating cash flow for firm (i) in 
year (t).
Because various past studies checked the 
level of accounting conservatism in financial 
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earnings represented in returns on 
investment (ROI
i,t+1
 dependent  variable in 
equation  no.2) is affected by earnings of 
the current year represented in γ
1
 coefficient 
more than total accruals represented in γ2 
coefficient. Then, our hypothesis in the 
previous equation is γ2-γ1<0 which indicates 
continuity of earnings in the coming years is 
more than the continuity of accruals as γ2<γ1 
known as earnings quality. To concentrate 
the continuity of accruals in earnings 
quality; we modify equation no.2 to become 
as follows:
This equation might be rewritten regarding 
accruals continuity in equation no.1 as 
follows:
As ρ
1
=γ
1
 and ρ2=(γ2-γ1), this evaluation saves 
us the direct evaluation for γ
1
-γ2 in equation 
no.2. Our first hypothesis is still ρ2<0 as it 
is more negative in accruals representing 
earnings that imply the presence of high 
quality earnings. This model will be given 
the symbol (EQR).
The Second Model
The second measure of earnings quality 
is use of absolute value of discretionary 
accruals. To extract discretionary accruals, 
we used the modified version of the Jones 
(1991) model adjusted by Dechow et 
al, (1995). This model will be given the 
symbol (EQJones), this which is one of the 
most used methods in measuring earnings 
management that is used in the opposite 
direction of measuring earnings quality. As 
earning management means the intentional 
interference in preparing financial reports 
by managers to achieve personal interests 
(Schipper, 1989), thus the opportunistic 
earnings management negatively affects 
earnings quality; this implies that the increase 
of  management earnings is followed by 
a reduction in earnings quality (Baxtert & 
Cotter, 2009). Calculating discretionary 
accruals can be done through the following 
steps:
Total accruals evaluation which is the a) 
difference between net income and 
operating cash flows, according to the 
equation no.1
Slope evaluation b) β
1
,β2,β3 in the following 
linear model:
Where: 
 TACCi,t: is total accruals of firm (i) in 
year (t).
 A
i, t-1
 : is total assets of firm (i) at the end 
of year ( t-1).
	rREVi,t : is change in revenues of firm 
(i) between years (t) and (t-1).
	rRECi,t : is change in receivables of firm 
(i) between years (t) and (t-1).
 PPEi,t : is the level of fixed assets of firm 
(i) in year (t). 
 ti,
 : random error. 
Normal accruals evaluation, using, c) 
β
1
,β2,β3 derived from equation no.6 as 
Follows:
Where: 
 NACCi,t: is normal accruals of firm (i) in 
year (t).
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After evaluating total d) 
and normal accruals, 
discretionary accruals 
(abnormal accruals), 
resulting from pursuit of earnings 
management, are computed as follows.
Reduction of absolute value of discretionary 
accruals reflect decrease in opportunistic 
earnings management which eventually 
leads to increase of earnings qualities 
reducing dishonesty thus expressing real 
status of the company. 
The relation between Earnings quality 
and  Accounting conservatism 
In our research on the relation between 
conservatism and earnings quality, we 
used two different methods to measure 
accounting conservatism. Afterwards, we 
measured earnings quality using two models 
at the first stage. While examining the 
relation between conservatism and earnings 
we designed two major models to measure 
this relation in which the dependent variable 
was earning quality.  Therefore, two linear 
models were created each of which contains 
two measures of accounting conservatism 
and group of controlling variables, to 
control the relation between dependent and 
independent variables. Thus, models used to 
represent the relation between conservatism 
and earnings quality are four in number: 
MODEL 1.1: EQR
In the first regression model, the dependent 
variable “earnings quality” was measured 
by using (Richardson et al, 2005) model and 
expressed through the continuous variable 
(EQRit) as follows:
Where: 
EQRi,t: is a continuous variable: dependent 
variable: earnings quality measured 
through (Richardson et al, 2005) model 
for the company (i) in the year (t).
BTMi,t: independent variable, book to 
market  ratio as measure of accounting 
conservatism of the company (i) in the 
year (t).
TATGPi,t: independent variable of total 
accruals to gross profit as measure of 
accounting conservatism of the company 
(i) in the year (t).
Sizei,t: control variable, size of the company 
measured  through  total assets of the 
company (i) in the year (t).
Leveragei,t: control variable, financial 
leverage ratio,  total debts/total assets  of 
the  company  (i) in the year (t). 
ROIi,t: control variable, return on investment, 
net income/equity of the company (i) in 
the year (t).
CurrRatioi,t: control variable, quick liquidity 
ratio, (current assets-inventory)/short 
term liabilities of the company (i) in the 
year (t).
IndBDi,t: control variable, independence 
of the members of board of directors 
measured by ownership of members of 
the board for shares of the company (i) 
in the year (t).
EATurnoveri,t: control variable, external 
auditor turnover, measured by number of 
years of work for the external auditor of 
the company (i) at the end of the year (t).
EAprofi,t: control variable, specialization of 
external auditor in customer’s industry. It 
is a dummy variable given (1) if the auditor 
is specialized in customer’s industry, or 
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else given (0), for the company (i) in year 
(t).  
IndACi,t: control variable, independence of 
members of audit committee, a dummy 
variable given (1) when all members of 
the committee are non-executive, if not 
given (0),  for  the company (i) in  the 
year (t).
ExperACi,t: control variable, financial 
experience of members of auditing 
committee measured by percentage of 
members holding a degree in financial 
sciences, for the company (i) in the year 
(t).
εi,t: random error.
MODEL 1.2: EQR-
DV
In the second regression 
model, dependent variable “earnings 
quality” was measured by (Richardson et al, 
2005) model and was expressed through the 
dummy variable EQRD-Vi,t as Follows:
Where: 
EQR-DVi,t: is a dummy variable: dependent 
variable ‘earnings quality’ is measured by 
using (Richardson et  al., 2005) model, (3) 
for high earnings quality (2) of doubtful 
earnings  quality (1) for lower earnings 
quality of the company (i) in the year (t).
MODEL 2.1:EQJones
In the third regression 
model, dependent 
variable “earnings 
quality” was measured 
by absolute value of discretionary accruals 
elicited through Jones, (1991) model as 
follows:
Where: 
EQJonesi,t is continuous variable: dependent 
variable  ‘earnings quality’ was measured by 
Jones (1991) model for the company (i) in 
the year (t).
MODEL 2.2: EQJones-DV
In the fourth regression  model, dependent 
variable “earnings quality” was measured 
by absolute value of the discretionary 
accruals elicited by Jones (1991) model 
and explained through dummy variables as 
follows:
Where: 
EQ JonesD-Vi, t: is a dummy variable, 
dependent variable ’earnings quality’ was 
measured by Jones (1991) model, (3) for high 
earnings quality, (2) for 
doubtful earnings quality 
and (1) for low quality 
earnings of the company 
(i) in the year (t).
The main hypothesis of the study aims at 
measuring the relation between earnings 
quality and accounting conservatism which 
will be tested by using the previous four 
models that can be outlined as follows: 
Ha: The presence of a reasonable level of 
accounting conservatism when preparing 
 
Vol. 16
No. 2
Vol. 16
No. 2
110
financial reports helps in increasing the 
level of earnings quality.
At the onset we have to examine validity 
of data for statistical analysis. For this 
purpose, we used normal distribution test, 
Multicollinearity test, Autocorrelation test, 
and Homoskedasticity  test. Validity of 
the study models representing correlation 
between accounting conservatism and 
earnings quality was secured. Thus, we 
can say that the study models in equations 
numbered (9, 10, 11, and 12) are accurate. 
All variables on the right side express non-
random variables excluding the last one ε
i,1
; 
εi,2; εi,3; εi,4  which is supposed to belong to 
natural distribution with zero average and 
fixed variance is expressed in σ2
1
; σ22; σ23; σ24 
.All these variables are independent ones. 
As for variables (EQR, EQRD-V, EQJones, 
and EQJonesD-V)they are dependent in the 
four models and have the same probability 
random error ε
i,1
; εi,2; εi,3; εi,4  with a variance 
of σ2
1
; σ22; σ23; σ24 and the average is:  
IV. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of 
the continuous variables, dichotomous, 
and dummy variables. In Part A the table 
shows two standards for measuring earnings 
quality which are (Richardson et al, 2005) 
model referred to by the symbol (EQR) 
which considers earnings quality to less 
represent accruals. Therefore, β or ρ2<0, is 
more negative in representing accruals of 
returns in equation 3 and this implies high 
earnings quality. From table 1 we noticed 
that the coefficient is low with a negative 
value and that refers to the high level of 
earnings quality declared by Jordanian 
industrial companies.
The second model was used to measure 
earnings quality is (EQJones) model based 
on absolute value of abnormal accruals. 
In part (c) of the table dummy variables 
were used to express earnings quality 
which was divided into three parts: High 
earnings quality, low earnings quality and 
questionable earnings quality. From this 
part of the table, we notice that high ratio 
of earnings quality was 47.7% according 
to EQR model, and 86.3% according to 
EQJones model. The ratio of low earnings 
quality was 50% according to EQR 
model and 13.7% according to EQJones 
model. Doubtful earnings quality was 2% 
according to EQR model, while there was 
no doubtful earnings quality according to 
EQJones model. These results are important 
indications of declared earnings quality that 
Jordanian companies 
enjoy. This result 
differ from findings 
of Qaraqeesh, (2009), 
he found that only 
10% of earnings of the Jordanian industrial 
corporations are distinguished for high 
quality and 12% of them are distinguished 
for low quality while the main ratio was 
for the doubtful earning quality which was 
78%. This discrepancy between our study 
and Qaraqeesh’s is due to difference in the 
methodology and time series used.
From table 1 part A, we notice that the two 
variables EQR and EQ Jones do not follow 
normal distribution because Skewness does 
not approach zero and Kurtosis  is far from 
3. This emphasizes that data of these two 
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variables never reach normal distribution. 
To overcome this problem natural logarithm 
was considered.
The two variables TATGP and BTM reflect 
the level of accounting conservatism 
in financial reports issued by Jordanian 
industrial corporations. The two negative 
ratios refer to accounting conservatism 
in financial reports. In table 1 part A, we 
notice that the Mean of the two ratios is 
positive and that reflects the low level of 
conservatism in financial reports of such 
companies. This result conforms too many 
results of previous studies that dealt with the 
level of conservatism in financial reports of 
Jordanian companies as presented in studies 
of Hamdan, (2012) and Mustafa (2008). 
Regarding relation between earnings quality 
and conservatism, our hypothesis was that 
such relation was positive in the sense that 
an increase in conservatism ensues increase 
in earnings quality. But table 2 does not show 
any relation with statistical significance 
between earnings quality and conservatism 
neither by using Pearson’s or Spearman’s 
tests. This gives us a preliminary indication 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for 50 industrial Jordanian listed companies during 2004-2009
Panel A: Continuous variables
Variable Minimum Maximum Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis
EQR -5.8E-05 1.4E-04 1.8E-06 2.3E-05 4.542 29.225
EQJones 857 94,987,322 2,744,096 8,947,228 6.222 47.623
BTM -4.470 6.540 0.964 1.017 1.715 12.479
TATGP -491.953 927.824 1.053 71.137 8.236 138.038
Size 430,303 1,083,134,000 43,649,884 122,732,088 5.501 34.771
Leverage 0.310 99.48 29.275 21.771 1.046 0.497
ROI -374 26.070 1.886 23.697 -13.554 213.916
CurrRatio 0.030 24.690 3.107 2.909 2.994 13.951
IndBD 0 89.250 15.521 18.848 2.061 4.514
EATurnover 1 6 5.307 1.290 -1.669 1.491
ExperAC% 0 1 0.434 0.260 0.394 -0.058
Panel B: Dichotomous variables
Variable Frequency of 1’s Frequency of 0’s
EAprof 137 (45.7%) 66 (22%)
IndAC 213 (71%) 86 (28.7%)
Panel C: Dummy variables of earnings quality
Variable High EQ Doubtful EQ Low EQ
EQRD-V 143 (47.7%) 6 (2%) 150 (50%)
EQJonesD-V 259 (86.3%) 0 (0%) 41 (13.7%)
Vol. 16
No. 2
Vol. 16
No. 2
112
that a relation between conservatism and 
earnings quality never exists. About relation 
between company size and earnings quality, 
table 2 shows negative relation, with 
statistical significance for Pearson>s or 
Spearman>s correlation regarding earnings 
quality measured by EQR model. Such a 
thing indicates that companies with higher 
size are with higher earnings quality. We also 
notice that companies with higher financial 
leverage are with higher earnings quality. 
From table (1) we also notice that return on 
investment (ROI) for Jordanian industrial 
companies were low through the period of 
study. It is negatively related to earnings 
quality according to Spearman’s test. We 
also notice that quick liquidity of Jordanian 
industrial companies was at average (3) 
which is within the suitable range; it has a 
positive relation with earnings quality which 
shows that companies which keep suitable 
liquidity are distinguished for their earnings 
quality. 
Regarding independence of member of 
directors, table 1 part A shows that average 
ownership of the members of board of 
directors for the company shares is 15% 
which sounds reasonable according to rules 
of corporate governance in Jordan. The 
highest amount was 89%, a high percentage 
that shows non-commitment to corporate 
governance. Unexpectedly, the percentage 
reveals negative relationship with quality 
earnings; the increase of ownership of 
members of the board of directors for the 
company stocks is highly related to earnings 
quality. The average turnover of external 
auditor at industrial companies is five 
years, one year minimally, and six years 
maximally.
The (EATurnover) has no significance 
relation with earnings quality which implies 
that the auditor’s work in the company is 
not followed by any activities on his part to 
increase earnings quality. As for experience 
of members of audit committee; we find 
that 43% of audit committee members 
have experience in banking and financial 
sciences. According to Pearson’s test, it 
has positive relation with earnings quality 
measured by (EQR) model. This shows that 
audit committee with financial experience 
is able to monitor company works and to 
achieve highest level of earnings quality.
Part B of table (1) shows dichotomous 
variables which include (AEprof)   that 
indicates 45.7% of auditors are specialized 
in industry of customer, this secures 
higher audit quality. It was found that this 
variable has positive relation of statistical 
significance, with earnings quality measured 
by EQJones model. Such a thing indicates 
that specialization of the external auditor in 
industry of customer contributes in improving 
earnings quality. Finally, we also found that 
majority of members of audit committee 
in Jordanian industrial companies does not 
belong to executive members. Such a thing 
increases their independence and ability 
to function impartially and independently. 
But this independence of members of audit 
committee has no relation to improvement 
of earnings quality. 
V. MODELS TESTING
        
Testing impact of conservatism 
on the enhancement of Earnings 
quality:
In the first model, (Richardson et al, 2005) 
method was used to explain earnings quality. 
Continuous variable (EQRi,t) was used once 
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and dummy variable (EQRD-Vi,t) was used 
in the other time. The results of the two sub-
models are shown in table 3. Then the sub-
model (1.1) it was tested by OLS method 
because dependent variable (EQRi,t) was a 
continuous variable. As for sub-model (1.2), 
it was tested through Binary Logit method 
because dependent variable (EQRD-Vi,t) 
was a dummy one. These two sub-models 
were under Pooled Regression method.
From table (3) we notice that the variable 
(BTM) of model 1.1 which represents 
accounting conservatism has a positive 
indication; which means that increase in 
accounting conservatism might contribute to 
enhancement of level of earnings quality, but 
this relation had no statistical significance 
at 1% or 5%, levels. So did the (TATGP) 
variable which showed a positive indication 
that had no statistical significance. Regarding 
sub-model 1.2 relation between accounting 
conservatism and earnings quality was 
negative. Despite being an illogical relation, 
it showed no statistical significant.
To assure pervious results, a second major 
model was used in which earnings quality 
was measured using Jones (1991) model 
whose results appear in table 4. From 
this table we notice that the two variables 
(BTM) & (TATGP) didn’t have any 
statistical significance. This emphasizes the 
results emerged using the first major model. 
When looking at which of the two models 
best represents the relationship between 
accounting conservatism and earnings 
quality, we compare between Adjusted R2 
shown in the two tables 3 and 4 of the two 
sub-models (1.1: EQR & 2.1: EQJones) and 
the (Akaike) value of the two models  (1.2: 
EQRD-V & 2.2: EQJonesD-V). Based on 
this, we notice that the value of Adjusted R2 
of the first sub-model of the second major 
model more than the value of Adjusted R2 of 
the first sub-model of the first major model 
(Adj. R2 of 2.1: EQJones > Adj. R2 of 1.1: 
EQR), and the (Akaike) value of the model 
(2.2) is less than model (1.2); (Akaike of 2.2: 
EQJonesD-V < Akaike of 1.2: EQRD-V). 
This indicates that the second major 
model based on Jones, (1991) was a better 
representative of the relation between 
accounting conservatism and earnings 
quality. Anyhow, based on the results of 
the two models we can never reject null 
hypothesis. Therefore, there are no statistical 
significance of accounting conservatism in 
improving earnings quality of the Jordanian 
industrial corporations. 
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Table 3: Pooled regression results to first model
Variable Predicted sign
Model1
Ordinary Least Squares Binary Logit
Model 1.1 EQR Model 1.2 EQRD-V
BTM + 0.107 -0.776
(0.915) (0.438)
TATGP + 1.090 -1.274
(0.277) (0.203)
Size +/- -2.605
** 0.774
(0.010) (0.439)
Leverage - 0.670 -4.218
**
(0.504) (0.000)
ROI +/- 1.165 -0.237
(0.246) (0.813)
CurrRatio +/- -1.395 -2.551
**
(0.165) (0.011)
IndBD - 0.664 -0.650
(0.507) (0.516)
EATurnover +/- -0.752 2.979
**
(0.453) (0.003)
EAprof - 1.505 -4.536
**
(0.134) (0.000)
IndAC - -0.943 1.084
(0.347) (0.279)
ExperAC - -1.392 -0.741
(0.166) (0.459)
F-statistic 2.055
*
p-value 0.026
R-Square 0.111
 Adjusted R-Square
(Akaike)
0.057 1.211
OLS: t-test (top), p-value (bottom), two-tailed. Binary logit: z-test (top), p-value (bottom). 
t-Critical: at df 39, and confidence level of  99% is 2.390  and level of 95% is 1.671 and 
level of 90% is 1.296
z-Critical: at confidence level of 95% is 1.650
F-Critical (df for denominator n-β-1 = 50-11-1 = 38) and (df for numerator =β =11) and 
confidence level of 99% is 2.730 and confidence level of 95% is 2.040 
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 Table 4: Pooled regression results to second model
Variable
 Predicted
sign
Model2
Ordinary Least Squares Binary Logit
Model2.1EQJones
 Model2.2
EQJonesD-V
BTM + -0.587 -1.292
(0.558) (0.197)
TATGP + 0.774 0.772
(0.440) (0.440)
Size +/- -2.181* 2.278*
(0.031) (0.023)
Leverage - 0.567 -0.968
(0.571) (0.333)
ROI +/- -1.382 1.152
(0.169) (0.250)
CurrRatio +/- -2.371* -2.711**
(0.019) (0.007)
IndBD - -0.435 -0.210
(0.664) (0.834)
EATurnover +/- -1.477 4.109**
(0.141) (0.000)
EAprof - -1.559 -0.158
(0.121) (0.875)
IndAC - 0.629 0.674
(0.530) (0.500)
ExperAC - 1.407 -1.201
(0.161) (0.230)
F-statistic 2.954**
p-valued 0.001
R-Squared 0.152
 Adjusted
 R-Squared
(Akaike)
0.101 0.744
OLS: t-test (top), p-value (bottom), two-tailed. Binary logit: z-test (top), p-value (bottom). 
t-Critical: at df 49, and confidence level of  99% is 2.390  and level of 95% is 1.671 and level 
of 90% is 1.296
z-Critical: at confidence level of 95% is 1.650
F-Critical (df for denominator n-β-1 = 50-11-1 = 38) and (df for numerator =β =11) and 
confidence level of 99% is 2.730 and confidence level of 95% is 2.040
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VI. TESTING THE CONTROL 
       VARIABLES
Company size and its impact on earning 
quality: tables (3) & (4) show that there is 
negative relation, with statistical significance, 
between company size and earnings quality. 
This shows that companies of big size are 
distinguished for higher earnings quality. 
Due to the commitment of big companies 
to apply accounting standards.  The study of 
Hamdan, et al, (2013, forthcoming) found a 
positive relation, between the company size 
and earnings quality measured by the model 
of Richardson, et al, (2005) while that 
relation had no influence on the earnings 
quality measured by the adjusted Jones, 
(1995) model.
Influence of financial leverage on earnings 
quality: Qaraqeesh, (2009) found that 
financial leverage affects the level of earnings 
quality in Jordanian industrial company. The 
company’s high financial leverage lowers 
earnings quality. Our findings, based on 2.1 
model, differ from Qaraqeesh’s findings. 
Table (3) shows negative effect, with 
statistical significance, on leverage variable 
of (EQRD-V). This shows that there is a 
positive relation between earnings quality 
and financial leverage; companies with 
higher debts are distinguished for earnings 
quality, but, leverage variable in the other 
models (EQR, EQJones, and EQJones D-V) 
had no effect on earnings quality.
Relation of return on investment to 
earnings quality: We examined whether 
there was a relation between returns on 
investment and the level of earnings quality. 
Tables 3 and 4 show no effect of ROI 
variable on earnings quality.
Relation between liquidity and earnings 
quality: Tables 3 and 4 show that there is 
negative impact, with statistical significance,, 
for (CurrRatio) liquidity variable on earnings 
quality measures. This reflects positive 
relation as high level of liquidity is related 
to increase of earnings quality which stems 
from low accruals of the company returns.
Impact of independence on the board of 
directors members on earnings quality: 
Using four models, our study did not find 
any impact of independence of the members 
of board of directors on the improving of 
earnings quality, on such independence, 
These findings conform to the findings of 
(Wang, 2007) who didn’t support (Lai & 
Tam, 2007; Jenkins, et al, 2006; (Qaraqeesh, 
2009) that increase of independent members 
in the board of directors contribute to 
improving of earnings quality.
Influence of external auditor turnover: 
According to the study of (Shokley, 1982), 
the long relation between the company 
and external auditor  might make him less 
creative by adoption of less rigid techniques 
and  depending on what the company does 
regarding procedures  and remedies without 
verification. Hamdan and Mushtaha, (2011) 
did not find any effect on average of external 
auditor turnover in improving quality of 
financial reports. In our study we found 
that there is positive impact, with statistical 
significance, of external auditor turnover 
variable on earnings quality (see models 
1.2 and 2.2). This is an evidence that when 
the period of work for external auditor is 
shorter, it provides him with more power 
to control company works to improve its 
earnings quality. 
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Influence of external auditor specialty on 
earnings quality:
 Study of Hamdan & Abu Ijeila, (2012) 
didn’t find any influence of external auditor’s 
specialty on customer’s industry, with regard 
to reducing practices of earnings management 
or improving the level of earnings quality. 
In our study, we did not find any influence, 
with statistical significance, of the variable 
(EAProf) on earnings quality in the three 
models: 1.1, 2.1 and 2.2, But it has negative 
influence, with statistical significance in the 
fourth model (1.2). This shows that there is 
positive relation between auditor’s specialty 
in the industry of the customer and earnings 
quality. The companies audited by external 
auditor specialized in their industry is more 
able to better understand its activities and 
procedures and thus improve its earning 
quality.
Influence of independence of audit 
committees on earnings quality: Study of 
Hamdan and (Mushtaha, 2008) didn’t find 
any impact of independence of members 
of the audit committee (executive and non-
executive) on improving quality of financial 
reports. Qaraqeesh (2009) found that there 
was positive influence for independence of 
members of audit committee on earnings 
quality. Our study disagrees with this 
finding as it did not find any influence, with 
statistical significance, for independence of 
members of audit committee on improving 
of earnings quality of Jordanian industrial 
companies. 
Influence of financial experience of 
members of audit committees on earnings 
quality: Study of Hamdan and (Mushtaha, 
2008) found out that financial experience of 
members of audit committees had helped 
in improving financial reports quality. This 
conforms to the findings of (Saleh  et al, 
2007) study  which  states that companies 
whose members of the audit committees have 
experience help  limit  practices of earnings 
management. In addition, Baxter and Cotter, 
(2008) and Qaraqeesh, (2009) found that 
financial experience of members of audit 
committee help in improving the level of 
earnings quality. Our findings disagree with 
past findings as (ExperAc) variable didn’t 
reflect any statistical significance in any of 
the four study models. Such a thing indicates 
that financial experience of members of 
audit committee in Jordanian companies 
didn’t help in raising the level of earnings 
quality in them. This discrepancy in results 
might be due to difference in methods and 
samples used in the present study.
VII. DISCUSSION OF 
        CONCLUSION AND 
        RECOMMENDATIONS
Earnings quality declared by companies 
plays an important role in economic decisions 
for many of concerned parties. Therefore, 
measuring the level of earnings quality 
and factors influencing it are considered an 
important issue for these parties.
The real contribution of the current study 
in existing literature in providing additional 
evidence about the relationship between 
accounting conservatism and earnings 
quality from developing countries. It 
also uses the new models to measure the 
earnings quality in Jordanian corporation, 
which in not used by previous studies in this 
environment (such as: Qaraqeesh, 2009). 
The importance of this study it is looking for 
relationship between the conservatism and 
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earnings quality in Jordan, which regularly 
takes steps towards the regulatory and 
legislative structure to support economic 
development, which distinguishes it from 
other studies conducted in the United States 
and Australia.
 Based on that, this study aimed at measuring 
the level of earnings quality announced by 
Jordanian industrial companies between 
2004-2009 using two different models 
(Richardson et al, 2005) and Jones (1991) 
modified by (Dechow et al, 1995). 
After measuring earnings quality, the 
study focused on measuring influence of 
accounting conservatism on improving the 
level of earnings quality to complete the 
study that looked into the role of accounting 
conservatism in improving the quality of 
financial reports and accounting disclosure.
Thus we made two major models which 
represent the relation between accounting 
conservatism and earnings quality. Findings 
of the study revealed that high percentage 
of Jordanian industrial companies were 
distinguished for earnings quality and 
that was contrary to Qaraeesh’s (2009) 
who found a low level of earnings quality 
for Jordanian industrial companies. 
This difference in results may be due to 
the different methodologies used, such 
asdifference in measuring earnings quality 
which may lead to different evaluation. The 
same company may have high evaluation of 
earnings quality or low one depending on 
the measurement model used (Abdelghani, 
2005), this discrepancy might also be due 
to different samples and time periods of the 
study.
In the second part of this study, the influence 
of conservatism on improving the level of 
earnings quality. Earnings quality was 
sometimes expressed through continuous 
variables and other times through dummy 
ones. By testing four models, this study didn’t 
find any indication to support our hypothesis 
that accounting conservatism helped in 
improving earnings quality in the Jordanian 
industrial companies. Those models which 
were supported by control variables showed 
that some influenced the level of earnings 
quality like company size, liquidity, and 
external auditor turnover, while others like: 
return on investment, independence of the 
members of board of directors, independence 
of audit committees, financial experience 
of members of audit committees, financial 
leverage, and specialization of external 
auditor in customer’s industry.   
  
In general,the study recommends that 
organizers of works of Jordanian companies, 
like the stock market and government 
authorities, support the mechanism 
of accounting conservatism, to secure 
more transparency in disclosures, and in 
improving earnings quality for they all 
leave a significant impact on the economic 
decisions of many parties.
However, with a small sample size, 
caution must be applied, as the findings 
might not be generalizable. This research 
has thrown up many questions in need of 
further investigation; it is recommended 
that further research be undertaken in 
the following areas: the impact of audit 
committee characteristics on enhancement 
of accounting conservatism, and factors 
affecting the earnings quality of Jordanian 
corporations. 
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